On the evening of 10 February 2026, Fernando Cerimedo took to the podium at Mar-a-Lago for the Hispanic Prosperity Gala. The event, hosted by an organization calling itself Latino Wall Street, featured video remarks from Argentine President Javier Meilei and an in-person appearance by Madrid’s President, Isabel Díaz Ayuso. 1 Cerimedo — an Argentine citizen based in Bolivia — was accepting the award for "Hispanic Political Consultant of the Year".

During his speech, Cerimedo switched to English in order to thank Brad Parscale, Trump’s former campaign manager. "Thank you for believing [in] me all this time,” he said, “and for giving me your technology." 2 Known for his high-level consulting work across Latin America, The Economist had given him a nickname: MAGA's man in Latin America, 3 Others have referred to him as Latino Steve Bannon. 4

But just six months after that Mar-a-Lago gala — at Viru Viru International Airport in Santa Cruz de la Sierra — Bolivian police arrested Cerimedo on femicide charges as he prepared to board a flight to Buenos Aires with a bag full of cash. 5

The night before, two men dressed as food-delivery couriers had shot Nadia Beller, a 33-year-old Bolivian lawyer and political activist. She was four weeks pregnant with Cerimedo's child. She had been lured to a hotel in Santa Cruz with an anonymous message promising damning information on former president Evo Morales. The would-be assassins fired three times at close range, stole her belongings, and fled on a stolen motorcycle when their own failed to start. 6 She survived, and from her hospital bed she started to talk.

Her testimony has now sparked a scandal that continues to ripple through Latin America — even though it has remained largely ignored by the mainstream US press. Today, her account threatens to bring down right-wing governments across the region — governments that have been propelled to power by Cerimedo’s criminal tactics.

But while Cerimedo is no doubt a major player in this game, he neither fixed its rules nor dominated the board. Both individuals and institutions in the United States and Israel — the key national nodes of the Reactionary International — have invested heavily in this political realignment, enabling operatives like Cerimedo to function effectively across the region.

To extrapolate from the Cerimedo case is thus to see the true architecture of the new Operation Condor: political consultants serving as instruments of imperial state policy, with the Trump administration using its puppets to systematically undermine democracy across the Western Hemisphere.

Inside the Modern Campaign Machine

Cerimedo’s strain of work is not historically unprecedented. Foreign consultants like Parscale and Cerimedo have operated in Latin America for over half a century 7 and the flow of Latin American political operatives between countries is not a new phenomenon. 8 While many Latin American countries maintain laws restricting unregulated “dark money”, both foreign and domestic, in campaigns 9 like their American counterparts, these rules contain exploitable loopholes or are rarely enforced. Moreover, previous political operatives were regularly discovered to have links with corrupt domestic elites or criminal networks. 10

What has fundamentally changed is that operators like Cerimedo now have access to the latest campaign technology from the United States, which instead of operating on media tactics like previous generations, relies on the tools of marketing and data to make other tactics more effective. The US spends more on campaigns than any other country; the 2020 and 2024 federal elections alone saw approximately $15 billion in spending,11 with at least $1.9 billion directed to online advertising. 12 American practitioners invest millions researching seemingly trivial details — such as how email formatting affects donation rates — resulting in extraordinarily refined operations. Hence, Americans hold no inherent advantage or natural knowledge. Rather, it's fundamentally a question of resources: they simply have access to far more capital than their international counterparts, allowing them to refine their methods more extensively.

A Campaign’s Central Nervous System: The Database

The most fundamental element of modern campaign infrastructure that Cerimedo and Brad Parscale have deployed is a campaign database, in their case, Campaign Nucleus. It functions as a customer relationship management system, similar to those used in business, allowing campaigns to consolidate and manage all voter and member data in one centralized location.

These databases can target voters by geography, age, voting history, and numerous other variables. A campaign can easily identify, for example, 18 to 26-year-old male voters in a specific region who have been active party members for two years, then send that list to event organizers planning outreach to young male supporters.

In comparison, many parties still rely on spreadsheets for member management, connected only to email services capable of sending emails with minimal additional functionality. Where such parties do maintain databases, they typically either replicate US technology or purchase platforms directly from American firms.

Voter Data: What Campaigns Know About You

With an operational database, campaigns can pull data from multiple sources to build detailed voter profiles: public party affiliation records, voter registries, door-to-door canvassing, and commercial databases. This combination allows campaigns to model individual voting behavior with considerable accuracy, a service Brad Parscale offers through Campaign Nucleus.

The depth of data available is staggering. These profiles use intimate personal details such as sexuality, race, financial status, even pet ownership. And this data is not just used by political operatives; commercial data brokers assemble similar profiles. McDonald's, for instance, compiled a 500-page dossier on a single customer predicting future consumption patterns. 13 And these kinds of data points are all used by campaigns to figure out who you are most likely to vote for.

Cambridge Analytica operated in this exact space. Its only distinction was drawing data from Facebook without user consent. 14 Yet dozens of competing firms offer comparable services, and the Facebook data was not significantly more useful to Trump's 2016 campaign than comparable data available to Clinton. The Cambridge Analytica scandal was simply an early, partial exposure of how modern American campaigns actually operate. 15

Through Campaign Nucleus, Brad Parscale can develop expensive voter profiles, however in a way that is not fundamentally different from commercial marketing databases. The innovation lies not in the data collection but in the application: the same infrastructure used to sell cars is now deployed to sell candidates. And operators like Cerimedo are some of the first to use these databases for elections in Latin America.

Targeting: Identifying and Persuading Voters

These variables are analyzed and fed into a predictive model that identifies two priority groups: strong party supporters who vote inconsistently, and consistent voters who are persuadable to your side. These models are demographics-based and therefore imperfect, they may misclassify some voters, but that is precisely why information is pulled from multiple sources. While the scores provide only rough guides, they allow campaigns to exclude people who are say 95% probable to be hostile to their party.

Consider a 57-year-old gun owner with military service living in a conservative area who has donated to the party but votes inconsistently. Such a voter would likely be targeted by conservative canvassers, since a doorknock would probably ensure they go out to vote. Conversely, a 23-year-old woman college student in the same household would likely be skipped entirely, since engagement would be unproductive given their probable leftward lean, following the general global trend of young women leaning left. 16

Of course determining which voters to target is only half the battle; then the question becomes what message is most effective. This is where analytics come in. Consultants like Brad Parscale use polling, focus groups, and A/B testing of online ads to gauge what resonates. By measuring responses across various metrics, campaigns can refine their messaging and identify which approaches work best.

Armed with a strong voter database and analytics, campaigns can also tailor messaging to specific subgroups. A direct mail or online program might target younger voters with environmental messaging (supported by polling data showing this resonates with that demographic), while union voters receive messaging about wages and working conditions. And there is evidence that this targeting has been used for more nefarious means in Latin American elections.

Manufacturing Consent: Influencers, Bots, and Artificial Amplification

Online advertising offers one of the most cost-effective targeting methods, particularly when leveraging data analytics. Within this space, influencer marketing has emerged as a critical strategy: campaigns increasingly rely on online personalities to amplify their message. In the US, major campaigns routinely pay tens of thousands per influencer post to reach their audiences 17 because voters trust people they watch every day online rather than the words of a random door-knocker. This is why influencer marketing has become ubiquitous online: because it's effective. Sometimes, recipients may not even realize they're seeing an advertisement. And Parscale’s company, Influencable is dedicated to this exact kind of work. 18

But on top of leveraging organic reach, one can artificially amplify it. Paid social media ads work, but they're expensive and marked as advertisements. Brad Parscale offers services for optimization and coordination to boost conservative influencer’s reach. 19 The more blunt alternative — and one of the services Cerimedo provides — is bots. In a 2023 interview, he claimed to operate over 50,000 bot accounts, 20 allowing him to simulate organic engagement.

However posts from random Twitter or Instagram accounts are seen as less legitimate than an official news site. That is why Cerimedo created La Derecha Diario (The Daily Right). People perceive content from a news-like website as more legitimate than a random social media post. The publication's format, its name, its design, a headline across an image, establishes apparent authority.

In more recent years Cerimedo and La Derecha Diario have updated the strategy somewhat: deceptively edited videos with misleading captions, or images with overlaid headlines, designed to appear as authentic news. The goal is shareability. When the content is shared to family group chats, rather than treating it as paid advertisements, people accept it more readily. It reads like real news, so they believe it is.

A post with one million likes spreads further and confers credibility; if a million people liked it, the reasoning goes, it must be true, and false stories, sufficiently amplified, can shift belief.

Automating Persuasion: The Use of AI By Campaigns

Along with social media manipulation, AI services represent a key offering in Brad Parscale's portfolio. His firm Eyes Over claims to offer AI-powered social media monitoring, a service that campaigns have long been able to access and that is entirely possible to do without large language models. While AI could definitely enhance such tools by processing large volumes of unstructured data concretely, these capabilities largely predated the recent "AI" branding.

Parscale has, however, developed other uses for AI. This includes an AI-powered mass texting campaign system. Traditionally, people manually send thousands of texts and respond using campaign-scripted language. His version eliminates the need for human click-through responses, automating replies with AI-generated messages and making it much more feasible to do at a massive scale. 21 More notably, Parscale has created websites optimized to be used by large language models like ChatGPT and Claude with pro Israel messaging, subsequently altering their responses to user inquiries. 22

And while there is no evidence that Parscale offers these services, there remains broader questions about the use of AI campaigns, such as the creation of deepfakes to spread fake news, and even more generalized “slopaganda” where AI is used to produce images and videos meant to anger and provoke a response. 23

However, the effectiveness emerges not from isolated tactics but from their integration, as these tactics all feed into each other. While they should not be considered "brain hacking," nor can these tools fundamentally change someone's political views. Yet they are undeniably effective. Integrated across voter modeling, influencer mobilization, and algorithmic manipulation, these tools can shift electoral outcomes in ways that remain difficult to detect or trace. The impact becomes particularly pronounced in asymmetrical scenarios: when one side deploys these tools aggressively while the other does not, the advantage can prove transformative. This is exactly what Cerimedo and Parscale can provide.

Israel: The Exceptional Node in the Network

But while these tools can be used by semi private actors such as Cerimedo and Parscale, there is also clear evidence that state actors have been willing to use them as well. One of the clearest examples is Israel, which has made building influence among the Latin American right one of its main foreign policy goals.

Israel became one of the first countries to systematically import American campaign consultants and embrace the US campaign model, bringing in famous campaign staffers for decades, 24 with the first known instance being all the way back in 1977. 25 The strategic alignment between the two countries naturally extended to their political operations. Today no Israeli political party is considered “serious” without American expertise on staff.

However, the Israelis have developed a consulting culture of their own, and these actors have been tied into its foreign policy for decades. Political leaders in countries like Serbia, 26 Greece, 27 Albania, 28 and Ukraine 29 have retained advisors linked to the Israeli government. Many more such arrangements undoubtedly exist and remain undisclosed.

Israel has also developed an extensive ecosystem of private firms and parastate institutions for exerting influence. In March 2026, a pro-Israel social media firm targeted La France Insoumise, a left-wing pro-Palestine party during local elections in the country. 30 It was later discovered that the same firm was also operating in the New York mayoral race (won by Zohran Mamdani), Scottish elections, and contests in Togo and Angola. 31 Around the same time, Black Cube, an Israeli intelligence firm, intervened in Slovenia's elections — which had one of Europe's most pro-Palestinian governments — by surveilling the incumbent prime minister to obtain compromising material. 32 The same firm has also targeted Cyprus's president, a nation of strategic importance to Israel. 33

While it remains unclear how connected the Israeli state is to these operations, since these firms can be contracted out privately, the Israeli government does maintain export control over their activities, and can block them if it does not align with state interests. Its capacity to monitor and halt such operations suggests tacit approval at minimum.

Additionally, the state does have the ability to directly fund these campaigns itself. Currently Israel has allocated roughly $730 million annually to hasbara, 34^ its term for influence campaigns. Within the United States, it has channeled millions to Brad Parscale in order to keep Trump voters pro-Israel position 19 and is spending millions more on targeted advertising to evangelical voters. 35 This U.S. spending represents only a fraction of Israel's available hasbara resources. Facing growing international isolation, Israel has systematically sought new allies through various means, with a strategic focus on building relationships with far-right movements, 36 particularly in Latin America.

The Cerimedo Story

Early Years

When Fernando Cerimedo first started doing this work, his methods were far less sophisticated than they would later become. He claims to have entered the field after completing a PhD at the University of Phoenix, after which he worked on the Obama campaign in 2008 and a subsequent White House position. This account is demonstrably false on several counts, but the easiest to verify is this: Cerimedo does not appear on any Obama campaign financial records as a paid staffer, nor is anyone bearing the name "Cerimedo" listed as receiving payments for any federal electoral campaigns. 37

What remains plausible, is that he performed unpaid work in a volunteer capacity for the Obama campaign. With over one million volunteers on the Obama 2008 campaign, 38 him having gone into an office and knocked on doors is entirely plausible. It is extremely common for such volunteers to later exaggerate their actual role in the campaign.

This also must be understood in its context. The 2008 US election sparked international fascination with anything connected to the Obama campaign. Senior Obama alumni became highly sought after in elections abroad. The 2015 UK general election, for instance, featured Obama operatives working for both the Conservative and Labour parties. 39 For Cerimedo, invoking Obama proximity was an efficient credibility builder. Until recently, the Obama campaign remained the global "gold standard" in electoralism, and association with it conferred legitimacy.

His actual introduction to digital campaigning tools came likely through his verified work at McCann advertising. The overlap between corporate marketing and political campaigning is substantial, particularly in digital strategy, and operatives commonly move between these sectors. His years at McCann make sense for where he would get a foot into the door for campaign work.

Around 2018, Cerimedo left McCann and went freelance. 40 He has since claimed involvement in a parallel campaign for Bolsonaro's 2018 campaign, designed to persuade "hostile voters," including gay voters. 41 While impossible to verify, a dark money campaign supporting Bolsonaro did exist during this period 42 — though its actual content seemed to have focused on attacking gay voters rather than persuading them. 43 But working for such a dark money campaign is not implausible either.

Nonetheless, his marketing background proved sufficient to secure his first Argentine political contract—not with Javier Milei, but with the left-wing Peronists.

During the 2019 Argentine election, he worked with Peronist youth activists on how to use digital campaigning to supplement their traditional organizing in Buenos Aires. One source recalled that he “taught us how to organize ourselves, how an algorithm works, how to better position a topic, and how to reach segmented users.” 40

However, in September 2019, while working for the Peronists, he started La Derecha Diario, a right-wing news aggregator that would become central to the online ecosystem that helped the libertarian Javier Milei become Argentina’s president. Through its Twitter (now X) feed, it regularly posted right-wing commentary, all while he ostensibly worked for its political opponents.

Simultaneously, he claims to have worked on Mauricio Macri's 2019 re-election campaign, the right-wing president opposed to the Peronists. He attributes his introduction to Patricia Bullrich, 44 a minister in his government, though this remains unverified and arguably implausible given that he allegedly worked for both sides. During the pandemic, he met with Bullrich to pitch his services for a potential 2021 campaign for congress, but they dismissed his pitch. A person from that meeting said: "He is a snake charmer. A great swindler who sells half-truths that are impossible to verify. For example: he told us that he worked for [Donald] Trump's campaign, but this is so broad that we are never going to be able to know. He also said that he had thousands of databases, but he never showed us anything." 40

Regardless, he had secured his first campaign contract and would leverage it to build his reputation. His second known contract was in 2020, during the pandemic, when he worked for the campaign to “Reject” drafting a new constitution. Through his firm, Numen, he published a poll in July showing 27.7% opposition to the new constitution, which was better than what “reject” was getting in most surveys. His subsequent polls showed rejection rates of 30-40%, significantly higher than other public polling. The actual result was only 21.72% against. He attributed the discrepancy to poor methodology, particularly an assumption of 100% turnout. 45 However, at the very least, he could use the campaign as evidence of involvement with a serious major right wing campaign.

Bots, fake news, and a visit from Eduardo Bolsonaro

By this point, his other project, La Derecha Diario had gained sufficient momentum and interest. Spanish far-right journalist Javier Negre invested in the outlet and joined it in June 2021. Afterwards the organization gradually transformed into a coordinated far-right news platform across Latin America, becoming central to reactionary digital organizing in the region. 46

Ahead of the 2021 Chilean elections he claimed to have worked for Chilean presidential candidate Sebastián Siche, the traditional right's nominee who received 12.79% in the first round, as well as Franco Parisi, a populist Chilean candidate who campaigned from Alabama and got 12.81% of the vote. Siche's associates disputed his involvement, stating he merely approached them with an offer of services, ^[47] and there is no strong evidence regarding his work for Parisi. What is verifiable, however, is his involvement in the 2022 Chilean referendum on the new constitution, continuing on his previous work.

Chilean voters ultimately rejected the new constitution, and shortly after the election results, he spoke with the outlet MDZ, which carried the headline “The crucial role of an Argentine in the 'Reject' campaign.” 48 During the campaign, it is known that he created the front group “Constitutional Facilitators” to spread fake news about the new proposed constitution, 49 but it is difficult to know his exact role beyond that. After the result came in, La Derecha Diario published false claims that left-wing President Boric had a mental breakdown, 50 a story that was amplified by bot networks within minutes of the story being published. 40 While La Derecha Diario’s claim about Boric was at worst marginally embarrassing for him, Cerimedo’s tactics would have far graver consequences in Brazil.

The country's far-right had already adopted the Trumpian playbook of suggesting fraud well ahead of the 2022 elections between the incumbent Jair Bolsonaro and challenger Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Jair Bolsonaro himself had suggested the election would be manipulated months before voting took place, 51 and like in the United States, these allegations only intensified following the election.

In the first round of the election Lula Inácio da Silva won 48.43% to Bolsonaro's 43.20%, a margin narrower than Lula had hoped, and leaving Bolsonaro with a plausible path to victory. There was a genuine chance Bolsonaro could make a comeback. Yet between the two rounds, Eduardo Bolsonaro, one of Jair’s sons, traveled to Argentina to meet with future Argentine president Javier Milei and Fernando Cerimedo. 52 Rather than campaigning during a critical moment, Eduardo decided it was more important to take this trip abroad. Bolsonaro ultimately lost the runoff, 50.9% to 49.1%, a narrow defeat that made the trip even more conspicuous.

On November 4 —five days after the election — the hashtag #BrazilWasStolen trended on Twitter, driven in part by coordinated bot activity. The Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) found that a cluster of newly created accounts generated nearly 5 percent of all tweets using the hashtag that day. 53 That same day, Cerimedo livestreamed allegations that the election had been stolen, claiming that voting machines had systematically favored Lula. The video was widely shared by right-wing Brazilian politicians 54 and became foundational to Brazil's stolen-election narrative.

Brazil's Superior Electoral Court quickly released a statement dismissing Cerimedo's claims, finding no evidence of election fraud. 55 The court also suspended his Twitter account for amplifying false claims, but by then the video had reached 400,000 viewers. 56 The livestream became a springboard for Brazil's far-right to further circulate the allegations and mobilize support. Bolsonaro's Liberal Party commissioned the Legal Vote Institute as part of its effort to “audit” the election, 57 and Bolsonaro's inner circle and Cerimedo were found to be citing the same sources to support their false fraud narratives. 58 Cerimedo repeated these claims before the Brazilian Senate in 2022 59 and Members of a subsequent military coup plot against Lula cited Cerimedo's claims as justification for alleging the election was stolen. 60 Though the coup attempt failed, the false fraud narrative activated far-right activists who stormed Congress, the Supreme Court, and the presidential palace in Brasília (See our Brazil case study)

Cerimedo emerged as a central figure in the disinformation campaign around the coup investigation, and was identified as the sole foreign national examined in connection with the storming of Congress and the coup attempt. 61 However, prosecutorial energy was mostly directed toward former President Bolsonaro, convicted and sentenced to 27 years, 62 leaving peripheral threads involving Cerimedo unpursued. “I am a hero to half the country. They call me the most beloved Argentinean in Brazil” he said about his work. 40

Javier Milei and Cerimedo's Path from Buenos Aires to Washington

Cerimedo's work in Brazil established him within Latin American far-right networks, but his role in Javier Milei's 2023 presidential campaign is what connected him to U.S. politics. He joined the campaign working on digital strategy with Santiago Caputo, 3 who had managed Milei's 2021 parliamentary campaign.

Javier Milei was considered a fringe candidate, and most Argentine political operators dismissed him accordingly. Cerimedo capitalized on this widespread skepticism to become one of the campaign's most important players. He offered two valuable assets: La Derecha Diario, which became one of the few outlets openly backing Milei and boosted his visibility, and the bot network that he deployed during the Argentine elections. 63

Milei's team, meanwhile, has longstanding U.S. contacts through the Atlas Network. The Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom at Florida International University — run by former Trump administration official Carlos Diaz Rosillo — partnered with the Milei associated Fundación Federalismo y Libertad to produce a podcast, paying the foundation over $79,000. The Argentine foundation also received funding from the International Republican Institute. 64 Diaz Rosillo met with Cerimedo in Argentina in March 2023, 65 likely being his introduction to this world.

In May of 2023, Cerimedo formally established Numen Advisors LLC in North Miami. While he claimed to have had U.S. corporate clients, this was the first documented instance of business in the United States. In September of 2023, Argentine-American operative Damian Merlo signed on to represent Milei in the U.S. through Numen Advisors. Merlo would reportedly later join the Milei campaign in some form. 3

His résumé according to his Linkedin includes working at the International Republican Institute (part of the National Endowment for Democracy) in charge of the Cuba, Mexico and Brazil program, a McCain foreign policy advisor, and a role at Otto Reich Associates, 66 whose namesake engineered Reagan's Central American policy during the dirty wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. 67

Merlo later managed Michel Martelly's 2011 presidential campaign in Haiti 68 and later became the Haitian state’s main representative in Washington 69 He would also represent El Salvador's far-right Bukele government 70 before offering his services to Milei.

Merlo's contract with Milei's team promised engagement with key members of the House and Senate, with particular focus on South Florida representatives, prominent DC think tanks, and assistance organizing a visit to Washington DC. 71 His major success, however, was arranging Milei's Tucker Carlson interview, 3 which significantly popularized the president among American conservatives.

Although the Milei administration allowed the contract with Merlo to lapse in an attempt to repair relations with the Biden administration — the Carlson interview had "infinitely pissed off the Biden people" 72 — these contacts provided Milei and Cerimedo with a crucial foothold in American political circles. This foundation would strengthen considerably, evidenced by Milei’s invitation to the right-wing CPAC 2024, where he met Trump face to face and subsequently by hosting CPAC Argentina in December 2024.

But the real impact for Cerimedo came through Javier Milei’s victory in the 2023 Argentine Presidential elections. The impact is best explained in Cerimedo’s own words: “I work for Milei for free. Today I could ask for any number I want, but Javier could not pay me even if I charged him a little.” 40 Now, with the reputation built through the campaign’s victory, he could turn his gaze across Latin America.

Enter the Donroe Doctrine

When Marco Rubio assumed his position as Secretary of State in January 2025, he brought his longstanding ideological commitment to Latin American intervention, shaped by his background as the son of Cuban immigrants from South Florida who had fled the Batista regime. Shortly after taking office, he declared in an op-ed: "When Donald Trump won his sweeping victory in November, he received a mandate to put America first. In the realm of diplomacy, this means paying closer attention to our own neighborhood—the Western Hemisphere." 73 Rubio's State Department quickly began to implement the Donroe Doctrine.

His tenure was marked by a willingness to impose tariffs on Colombian 74 and Brazilian presidents for refusing to align with Trump's dictates, 75 with Trump labeling the former an "illegal drug leader." 76 He launched bombing campaigns in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, 77 brokered a deportation agreement with Bukele to funnel migrants into detention facilities, 78 and orchestrated numerous other interventions. His methods included a $20 billion financial aid package to Argentina in order to boost the local currency and influence Argentinian midterm elections, 79 promising the pardon of Honduras's former president days before a national election, 80 the kidnapping of former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro followed by the conversion of Venezuela into a U.S. resource colony, 81 and campaigns to destabilize Cuba. These actions exemplified the renewed interventionist doctrine.

Enter Fernando Cerimedo, who formed a partnership with Brad Parscale in March of 2025 where he would represent Brad Parscale’s firms, Campaign Nucleus and Eyes Over, in Latin America. The La Derecha Dairo article announcing this partnership has him saying that “the magnitude, the innovation, and the possibilities that open up are simply impressive” with the article claiming that “the arrival of these tools in Latin America could mark a turning point in the way electoral campaigns are designed and executed in the region”

The extent of their involvement in Latin American campaigns between March and August 2025 remains unclear. Though evidence of bot activity surfaced during the 2025 Ecuadorian 82 and Chilean elections, 83 it is uncertain whether Cerimedo orchestrated these campaigns, and if either of them intervened beyond that. However, La Derecha Diario actively backed right-wing candidates across these contests, making at least Cerimedo’s involvement through bot networks plausible.

The first known consulting work Cerimedo did in South America after the deal with Parscale was in Bolivia, where Cerimedo initially supported libertarian Jaime Dunn for the presidency. While Dunn has denied Cerimedo’s involvement 84 there was a bot push claiming Dunn would qualify for the ballot 85 and supposed endorsements by Bukele and Milei created using AI, 86 he was ultimately unable to participate in the 2025 Bolivian elections.

Cerimedo then switched his support to Paz after he entered the second round. An article in La Derecha Diario published after the election insulted the consultant working for Paz's opponent, saying that Cerimedo is "the architect of a modern, digital communication approach that once again outperformed the classic model of electoral marketing." 87 Cerimedo claimed he worked for free and Paz's Vice President, who has since broken with the government, claimed that after the election Cerimedo became a key player in the Bolivian government, 88 despite lacking an official role.

The second confirmed collaboration between Cerimedo and Parscale emerged in Honduras. Cerimedo operated on the ground, securing a critical endorsement from Donald Trump through another US consultant Dick Morris, 89 while Parscale provided data strategy remotely from the United States. 90 There is evidence of several American-style campaign techniques throughout the campaign, most notably the deployment of mass texts to voters, a method Parscale currently employs for his Israel influence campaigns in the United States. 21

The message sent to voters read: "Remittances cannot be lost. Voting so that your remittances arrive is important. Don't vote for Rixi Moncada. #YouChoose" 91

With Asfura officially winning by less than 1 percent of the vote, Cerimedo and Parscale's assistance, combined with direct Trump administration intervention, almost certainly determined the election's outcome.

Leaked audio files revealed earlier this year through the Hondurasgate scandal exposed an international conspiracy far more expansive than previously understood. The Trump administration, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Javier Milei intervened to boost Asfura during Honduras's presidential election. Once he returned to power, Honduran state resources were then supposedly used to fund anti-left campaigns in Mexico and Colombia (see our report on Hondurasgate). Among Asfura’s first acts as president was a visit to Israel.

More recently, Cerimedo and Parscale appeared to play a role in the Peruvian election, with Eyes Over tracking the race, 92 and both Parscale 93 and Cerimedo 94 95 suggesting their involvement on Twitter. During the election, automated accounts were set up urging people to spoil their ballots, and these efforts were primarily focused on in areas that historically tended to vote for left wing candidates. It has been reported that Carlos Diaz Rosillo helped set Cerimedo up with Keiko Fujimori’s team, and that he was in charge of setting up the website “Ojo de Condor” which promoted a citizen parallel count. The final margin was around a quarter of a percent, making their support almost certainly decisive. After Keiko Fujimori’s victory, Javier Negre helped arrange her visit with Donald Trump at Mar-A-Lago. 96 Keiko has denied that Cerimedo was involved in her campaign, and that she had any relationship with him, but she was photographed at the Hispanic Prosperity Gala speaking with him 97 along with another Argentinian advisor of hers, Damián Valenzuela. 98

Involvement in Colombia is also plausible but unconfirmed. However, Cerimedo's associate at La Derecha Diario, Javier Negre, claimed involvement with the campaign of elected far-right president Abelardo de la Espriella, 99 who won by less than one percent. And Colombia's former president has accused the Israeli firm Black Core — which has attempted to interfere in elections with pro-Palestinian candidates elsewhere — of meddling in the race. 100

The pattern is unmistakable: coordinated networks span multiple countries, operating on behalf of foreign interests and demonstrably shaping electoral outcomes. Ironically, the Trumpist right accuses USAID of secretly funding Latin American left-wing victories through misappropriation. In doing so, their conspiracy theories accidentally expose the actual mechanism of US electoral influence, one where USAID and its sister organization, the National Endowment for Democracy, function as vital tools for US intervention across the region. They identify the very infrastructure through which US influence used to operate, while misunderstanding its goal.

Brad Parscale's own words offer the clearest summary of what's actually happening. When responding to a post celebrating recent far-right victories, supposedly resulting from Trump's USAID cuts, Parscale responded with "Maybe a little more help also.” 101

Cerimedo Unmasked

While there was significant focus on the clear policy interventions that the second Trump administration has taken to influence elections, the more subtle ways foreign actors have attempted to intervene in Latin American elections have remained largely uncovered. Plenty of headlines address Trump's use of tariffs as electoral influence, 102 but Brad Parscale's potential involvement in Keiko Fujimori's recent electoral success received almost no scrutiny, despite how open he was about his interest and work for the candidate. Even the Hondurasgate scandal centered on how the United States uses state power to influence outcomes, treating Cerimedo, until recent revelations, as a facilitator rather than a principal actor.

That changed after Fernando Cerimedo attempted to kill Nadia Beller. The incident accomplished two things: it shone a spotlight on a previously obscure actor, and it exposed his deep links to state power. Though discontent with Cerimedo's influence had simmered for months—Bolivia's Vice President, Edmund Lara, had already broken with the administration—it had not penetrated public consciousness, especially abroad. The attempted murder changed that, forcing scrutiny on his role, where it was later discovered that he was a key player in the administration, effectively functioning as a government minister without an official role.

Such a heinous act prompted everyone to distance themselves from Cerimedo. But the sheer number of people attempting to deny a connection, and the transparent falsity of their denials, revealed how connected Cerimedo was.

The most absurd came from Javier Negre who claimed that Cerimedo had long severed ties with the site he helped create. Negre asserted that Cerimedo had previously sold his stake and played no role in its operations, and denied that La Derecha Diario used bots on social media. 103 Yet the website continued providing favorable coverage of Cerimedo throughout the period when Negre claimed he had severed ties. As recently as May 31st 2026, he wrote a piece in part touting himself and La Derecha Diario’s centrality to the right-wing wave in Latin America. 104

More fundamentally, Negre cannot be separated from this network. He functions in a similar capacity to Cerimedo, using the website to attack the left while marketing his connections to figures like Donald Trump and Javier Milei. 105 Regardless, Negre’s claim of Cerimedo’s non-involvement was also quickly exposed as false: Cerimedo only sold his stake in the company after his arrest, 106 directly contradicting Negre’s earlier statements. And La Derecha Diario remains a key part of the larger ecosystem that the Cerimedo case helped expose.

In Bolivia, with Rodrigo Paz, Nadia Beller accused Cerimedo of being at the heart of a corruption scheme. She claimed that Paz and his wife were engaged in "business dealings with gasoline, diesel, and gold," with Cerimedo functioning as an intermediary through whom money flowed via contracts secured by Paz's inner circle with major businesses. 107 President Paz responded with ten days of silence. Only under considerable pressure did he finally speak, claiming that Cerimedo had never been authorized to represent the government. 108 Beller countered with photographs showing Cerimedo seated alongside Paz and Marco Rubio at the Summit of the Americas 109 and images of him inside the presidential offices. 110 Vice President Lara has since lodged complaints against Cerimedo and Rodrigo Paz's wife, alleging influence peddling. 111

In his native Argentina, Javier Milei has maintained that he severed ties with Fernando Cerimedo in 2023, apparently following his work on Milei's campaign. This claim is contradicted by documented visits to the Casa Rosada between January and June 2024. 112 And from May to November 2024, Cerimedo's wife, Natalia Basil — from whom he is now separated — worked for the National Disability Agency, an agency later engulfed in scandal when it emerged, through leaked audio recordings, that Milei's sister, Karina Milei, was receiving kickbacks of approximately 3% on medicine purchases. 113 Beller has accused Basil of leaking the audio recordings. 114 Cerimedo has been living in Bolivia for some time, after purportedly having a falling-out with Milei’s inner circle, 3 though his motive for leaking those audios—if he was indeed responsible—remains unclear.

In Chile, President Kast has admitted to knowing Cerimedo but denies that he worked on his campaign. However, members of his own ruling coalition — including former presidential candidate from Chile's traditional right Evelyn Matthei — have called for regulations on bot usage following the revelations. 115 The left opposition has demanded a more thorough investigation as despite Kast claiming that “[Cerimedo] would have advised those leading the Rejection campaign, which was not the campaign of [Kast's party]" there is substantial overlap between the Reject campaign and Kast's government. The most prominent of which is Alejandro Irarrázaval, who now heads the president's advisory team. 116 Adding to the questions about Kast's account of the relationship, Nadia Beller has claimed that Cerimedo stated he “made a new president” and planned to attend Kast’s inauguration. 117 Chile's prosecutor's office is now investigating, 118 while the opposition has successfully established a special investigative commission to examine the issue. 119

Elsewhere, former Colombian President Gustavo Petro has called for a criminal investigation into Fernando Cerimedo and Javier Negre, alleging that their bot farms influenced the results of the Colombian presidential election. 120 Rixi Moncada of Honduras, a candidate in an election where Cerimedo and Parscale advised her opponent, has similarly demanded an investigation. 121

The Assault Continues

With Brazil's election just a month away, it represents the next country on the United States' target list.

Earlier this year, Flávio Bolsonaro—the right-wing presidential candidate selected only because his father was barred from running—met with foreign diplomats to promote fraud allegations ahead of October's presidential election. 122 He was already attempting to replicate the playbook the Bolsonaro family employed with Cerimedo in 2022 to undermine the election's legitimacy. Days later, his brother Eduardo Bolsonaro appeared in a livestream with Cerimedo, amplifying the same allegations. 123 The goal was clear: to undermine the legitimacy of the election like in 2022.

The Bolsonaro campaign has already shown it is willing to use dark money to influence the campaign. Intercept Brasil published messages between Flávio Bolsonaro and Daniel Vorcaro, a disgraced banker central to Brazil's largest bank fraud, revealing arrangements to transfer 4 million USD for financing Dark Horse, a biopic about Bolsonaro scheduled for release shortly before the election. 124 Therefore, the question becomes: what else are they attempting to do, and how does it link to the Cerimedo network.

While Cerimedo's arrest may prevent direct participation, this raises a critical question: is Brad Parscale involved? More fundamentally, Cerimedo's absence is irrelevant; others can assume control of his bot networks and infrastructure. Brazil is already struggling with AI-generated disinformation flooding social media. 125 And given the Bolsonaro family's demonstrated willingness to operate outside the law to advance their electoral prospects, it is entirely plausible they are already leveraging the broader Cerimedo network, including figures like Parscale and Javier Negre, to ensure the defeat of the Brazilian left. Flávio Bolsonaro did launch his presidential campaign with kudos from both Benjamin Netanyahu and Javier Milei, as well as an AI-generated video of his father. 126

But unlike 2022, the Bolsonaros now have a powerful ally in the White House. While the Biden administration actively worked to prevent a military coup on Bolsonaro's behalf, 127 the Trump administration appears openly supportive of regime change by any means necessary. This shift is evident in recent actions: the U.S. imposed 50% tariffs against Brazil for the "witch hunt" against Jair Bolsonaro. 128 In May, before Flavio began promoting fraud claims, he traveled to the United States to meet with President Trump, Marco Rubio, and JD Vance. 129 During his meeting with Trump, Flavio requested that the State Department designate Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho — two Brazilian criminal organizations — as terrorist groups. 130 Shortly after this meeting, the designation was granted. 131

Subsequently, in July, State Department officials Riley Barnes and Samuel Samson attempted to travel to Brazil, apparently aiming to undermine the legitimacy of the Brazilian electoral system and meet Flavio Bolsonaro. 132 Samson, in particular, plays a major role in building Trump's global "Make America Great Again" alliances, meeting with various far-right European parties. 133 However, Brazilian officials denied their visas. In response, the United States revoked the visa of Brazil's ambassador to the United States. 134

Lula has directly pushed back against the Trump administration's interference. "As far as I'm concerned, he can keep liking Bolsonaro… After all, there's no accounting for taste" Lula stated, before adding pointedly: "However, he should not meddle in Brazil's elections." He also challenged Trump to "learn from Brazil's civilized elections." 135 The question remains if Trump will listen.

The next country the United States may target is Mexico, where Cerimedo allegedly stated he planned to intervene to "blow up" President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo. "He told me that the President had referred to him, that she was a crazy woman, that she was delusional, things of that nature," Beller has claimed to have been told by Cerimedo. 136 Although Mexico moved to add protections against foreign interference in May of 2026, 137 the United States has continued taking actions like revoking visas of figures associated with the ruling government, including the son of former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 138 There are also signs of bot activity in the country, with Mexico's anti-government Gen Z protests last year showing clear evidence of heavy bot amplification. 139 And while Javier Negre failed to get the money he wanted for La Derecha Diario Mexico, the businessman he was speaking with will likely just provide the funding to an organization they view as more effective. 105

But the interference will not stop in either Brazil or Mexico. The United States has openly begun using state resources to boost far-right causes in Europe, funding think tanks 140 and media organizations, 141 and they are likely doing the same in Latin America. There has been limited pushback against brazen electoral interference by Israeli parastate actors in Europe, and it is only a matter of time before similar operations are discovered in Latin America. Groups like CPAC have explicitly stated that their goal is to "take out" progressive political leaders in Latin America and elsewhere. 142 Cerimedo's bot network may go dormant, but the broader assault on the Latin American left will likely continue.

Conclusion

While much remains to be uncovered — and public investigations in countries like Chile will undoubtedly reveal further details — the general outline is already clear: A serial fabulist turned marketer who sold himself as an expert on social media campaigning, deploying bots and other manipulative measures to amplify his influence. This skill set, and association with Javier Milei, made him valuable enough to be recruited by campaign consultants tied to the U.S. state apparatus, who used him as part of their multi-front war against the Latin American left hoping to transform the region under the hegemony of the United States.

But several critical questions persist. Cerimedo claimed to work for prominent clients like Rodrigo Paz for free, 88 yet simultaneously stated he was expensive to hire. 40 The money came from somewhere. He has reported earning close to a million dollars monthly through his work, and 44 million were discovered to have passed through a bitcoin wallet owned by Cerimedo, 143 a sum comparable to Parscale's reported contracts in the United States on behalf of Israel. 144

Notably, we only know of Parscale's Israeli work only because U.S. law requires disclosure. As the Israeli government allocates $730 million annually for Hasbara operations 34 and has demonstrated a clear interest in installing pro-Israeli governments across Latin America, it is entirely plausible that some of these resources are being deployed in the region. Fernando Cerimedo's Twitter bio offers a telling clue: it displays flag emojis for five countries—his native Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, the United States, and Israel. 145

His arrest may ultimately precipitate the early collapse of Rodrigo Paz's presidency, given how deeply intertwined Cerimedo is with the government. Certainly, Cerimedo was never elected by the public. Yet if this merely triggers early elections, little will prevent the same forces that manipulated the last Bolivian election from repeating the process.

Governments seeking to protect their democracy must now regulate the ecosystem of paid influencers, bots, and data being weaponized against democratic processes, ensuring that these foreign actors cannot intervene as easily. Governments could, for example, implement some straightforward regulatory measures, such as banning payments to influencers who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or interests.

But if Cerimedo exits politics, Israeli and American parastate actors — Parscale, Black Cube, Black Core and others — will remain, retaining access to the same marketing tools and voter rolls that made Cerimedo’s work more effective. The only difference being that they will need to find a new local partner through which they can sell their tools and advocate on their behalf.

While Cerimedo had cultivated a bot network and built genuine influence through a right-wing disinformation apparatus centered around La Derecha Diario, his own admission revealed the core truth: the technology and operational support from the United States proved far more effective than his own efforts.

As his announcement of the partnership with Brad Parscale claimed: "The arrival of Campaign Nucleus and Eyes Over in the region could revolutionize electoral campaigns in Latin America." 146 Cerimedo may be removed from the equation, and his bot network may become dormant, but Parscale can readily transfer this infrastructure to another operative. Eyes Over itself possesses bot-detection capabilities 147 so it's not like the work of Cerimedo is unique or particularly notable. He was merely the face tasked with its implementation across Latin America.

Given how deeply this network is integrated within the American state apparatus, Cerimedo must be understood not as the architect of this strategy, but as a pawn of the Monroe Doctrine's latest iteration. If he becomes merely the fall guy, the network will continue undermining democracy unimpeded. The true threat lies not in one man, but in the system that produced him. It will continue to produce others, even if Cerimedo spends the rest of his days rotting in prison.

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[65] Fernando Cerimedo [@FerCerimedo_ok], “Gran desayuno de trabajo esta mañama con Carlos Diaz Rosillo, principal asesor del secretario de defensa en asuntos de seguridad internacional del gobierno de @realDonaldTrump. Se vienen cosas muy buenas estos próximos años! https://t.co/uJd5Le8rxe,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/7b2Sm

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[71] “FARA Contract Between Cerimedo and Merlo.” Accessed: Sep. 01, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6898-Exhibit-AB-20230929-9.pdf

[72] Joseph Zeballos-Roig, “Argentine president drops pro-Trump lobbyist,” Semafor. [Online]. Available: https://www.semafor.com/article/04/08/2024/argentine-president-drops-pro-trump-lobbyist

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[79] Tom Phillips, “Trump’s bailout threat may have been key to Milei’s electoral triumph in Argentina,” The Guardian, Oct. 27, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/27/trump-javier-mileis-electoral-triumph-argentina

[80] Christopher Sherman and Mike Catalini, “Former Honduras President Hernández freed from prison after Trump pardon,” PBS News. [Online]. Available: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/former-honduras-president-hernandez-freed-from-prison-after-trump-pardon

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[82] Redacción Plan V, “Elecciones 2025: esta fue la millonaria campaña en redes y de bots que se desplegó en Ecuador,” Redacción Plan V. [Online]. Available: https://planv.com.ec/historias/politica/elecciones-campana-redes-sociales/

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[84] La Patria, “Dunn sobre Cerimedo: Buscó asesorar a todos, no tiene coherencia,” La Patria Bolivia. [Online]. Available: https://lapatria.bo/enfoque-nacional/denuncia/dunn-cerimedo-busco-asesorar-todos-no-tiene-coherencia/

[85] EFE, “El TSE de Bolivia no habilitó la candidatura presidencial del economista Jaime Dunn,” SWI swissinfo.ch. [Online]. Available: https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-tse-de-bolivia-no-habilit%c3%b3-la-candidatura-presidencial-del-economista-jaime-dunn/89664025

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[87] Editorial Team, “From guru to serial loser: the decline of political consultant Jaime Durán Barba,” La Derecha Diario en Inglés. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/gXJn2

[88] Soledad Vallejos, “El encantador de serpientes de las nuevas derechas latinoamericanas,” Nueva Sociedad. [Online]. Available: https://nuso.org/articulo/cerimedo-derecha-america-latina/

[89] Luis Escalante, “Cerimedo y Dick Morris, los autores de la movida política que lleva a Trump a bendecir candidatura de Nasry Asfura en Honduras,” Contra Corriente. [Online]. Available: https://contracorriente.red/2025/11/27/fernando-cerimedo-el-asesor-tras-el-post-de-trump-que-se-le-adelanto-a-nasralla/

[90] Kenneth P. Vogel, David C. Adams, and Jack Nicas, “Trump’s Former Campaign Manager Assisted Honduran Presidential Candidate,” The New York Times, Dec. 04, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/03/us/politics/brad-parscale-trump-honduras-asfura-pardon.html

[91] Libre Party, “Judicial Complaint.” Dec. 12, 2025.

[92] eyesover [@eyesover_us], “Great election intelligence isn’t just about calling the outcome. It’s about understanding how a race is moving before the final count is complete. During Peru’s 2026 presidential election, EyesOver tracked Keiko Fujimori’s lead in real time, captured the tightening margin in https://t.co/vXOdydSOHU,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/Z1BwV

[93] Brad Parscale [@parscale], “Keiko Fujimori is fighting for Peru. Sunday will be another step to determine the direction of South America. The West is worth fighting for. We will win! 🏆,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/NcdKV

[94] Fernando Cerimedo [@FerCerimedo_ok], “Don’t worry. They won’t succeed this time.😉,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/MzIIr

[95] Fernando Cerimedo [@FerCerimedo_ok], “Update: 🇧🇴 Misión cumplida 🇭🇳 Misión cumplida 🇵🇪 Siguiente parada,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/lqzB4

[96] Martha Valencia, “Así intervino el operador regional Fernando Cerimedo en la campaña electoral de Keiko Fujimori,” El Búho. [Online]. Available: https://elbuho.pe/2026/08/keiko-fujimori-integro-como-asesor-principal-de-su-campana-electoral-al-operador-regional-cerimedo/

[97] Ángel Páez, “Keiko Fujimori estuvo en Florida en gala con Damián Valenzuela y Fernando Cerimedo,” La República. [Online]. Available: https://larepublica.pe/politica/2026/09/03/keiko-fujimori-estuvo-en-miami-en-gala-con-damian-valenzuela-y-fernando-cerimedo-javier-negre-hnews-37188

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[99] Javier Negre [@javiernegre10], “Salgo de Colombia con la sensación de haber vivido la campaña electoral más épica de mi vida. Cuando conocí a @DELAESPRIELLAE gracias a Ospina claro que era un hombre enviado por Dios para salvar a este bello país de las garras del narcotráfico y del comunismo. Le vi tan decidido https://t.co/ZhCyMdkhSj,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/2jwCX

[100] Joshua Carroll, “Colombia’s Outgoing President Says Israeli Firm Meddled in Election,” Novara Media. [Online]. Available: https://novaramedia.com/2026/07/15/colombias-outgoing-president-says-israeli-firm-meddled-in-election/

[101] Brad Parscale [@parscale], “Maybe a little more help also.😉,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/nMReI

[102] Tom Phillips, “Echoes of cold war as US accused of meddling in another Brazilian election,” The Guardian, Sep. 01, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/01/us-trump-rubio-meddling-brazil-election

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[104] Fernando Cerimedo, “La izquierda perdió la calle y ahora quiere demonizar la estrategia de la nueva derecha,” La Derecha Diario. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/scGoG

[105] Fernando Peinado and Julio Núñez, “Javier Negre Inc, the hoax multinational,” El País English. [Online]. Available: https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-07-18/javier-negre-inc-the-hoax-multinational.html

[106] Alejandro Alfie, “Fernando Cerimedo vendió el 50% de La Derecha Diario cuando ya estaba detenido en Bolivia,” Clarín. [Online]. Available: https://www.clarin.com/politica/fernando-cerimedo-vendio-50-derecha-diario-detenido-bolivia_0_NQwxYeC30X.html

[107] Javier Lorca and Caio Ruvenal, “La detención de un consultor de ultraderecha acusado de intento de feminicidio activa denuncias de corrupción en Bolivia y Argentina,” El País América. [Online]. Available: https://elpais.com/america/2026-08-19/la-detencion-de-un-consultor-de-ultraderecha-acusado-de-intento-de-feminicidio-activa-denuncias-de-corrupcion-en-bolivia-y-argentina.html

[108] infobae, “Rodrigo Paz negó que Fernando Cerimedo fuera su asesor y afirmó que nunca tuvo autorización para representar al Gobierno de Bolivia,” infobae. [Online]. Available: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/08/27/rodrigo-paz-nego-que-fernando-cerimedo-fuera-su-asesor-y-afirmo-que-nunca-tuvo-autorizacion-para-representar-al-gobierno-de-bolivia/

[109] Nadia Beller, “En ‘la oficina’, su oficina del piso 23 de la casa grande del pueblo (Mayo) Con Rodrigo Paz en el escudo de las Américas (marzo),” Facebook. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/Uj9Rx

[110] Nadia Beller, “Una foto más de su escritorio, en su oficina, en el...,” Facebook. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/ihBEo

[111] ERBOL, “Lara denuncia a Cerimedo y la Primera Dama por seis presuntos delitos,” Opinión Bolivia. [Online]. Available: https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/lara-denuncia-cerimedo-primera-dama-seis-presuntos-delitos/20260901194450995563.html

[112] Ambito, “El Gobierno ratifica que ‘Javier Milei no tiene relación con Cerimedo desde 2023’, pero admite ingresos a Casa Rosada,” Ambito. [Online]. Available: https://www.ambito.com/politica/gobierno-ratifica-que-javier-milei-no-tiene-relacion-cerimedo-2023-pero-admite-ingresos-casa-rosada-n6314537

[113] Buenos Aires Times, “Milei shuts down ANDIS disability agency tainted by corruption claims,” Buenos Aires Times. [Online]. Available: https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/milei-shuts-down-andis-disability-agency-tainted-by-corruption-claims.phtml

[114] La Nacion, “Quién es la exesposa de Cerimedo a la que Nadia Beller acusó de filtrar los audios de la causa Andis,” La Nacion. [Online]. Available: https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/quien-es-la-exesposa-de-cerimedo-a-la-que-nadia-beller-acuso-de-filtrar-los-audios-de-la-causa-andis-nid18082026/

[115] Antonia Laborde, “Kast admite que conoce a Cerimedo, el exasesor de Milei, pero niega haber trabajado con él en sus campañas,” El País Chile. [Online]. Available: https://elpais.com/chile/2026-08-31/kast-admite-que-conoce-a-cerimedo-el-exasesor-de-milei-pero-niega-haber-trabajado-con-el-en-sus-campanas.html

[116] Leonardo Buitrago, “Kast toma distancia de Cerimedo, pero diputados ponen el foco en los vínculos del argentino con Irarrázaval y Costabal: ‘No le creemos al Presidente,’” El Ciudadano. [Online]. Available: https://www.elciudadano.com/politica/kast-toma-distancia-de-cerimedo-pero-diputados-ponen-el-foco-en-los-vinculos-del-argentino-con-irarrazaval-y-costabal-no-le-creemos-al-presidente/09/01/

[117] Diego Cabanillas, “Expareja de Cerimedo asegura vínculo de asesor con campaña de Kast: ‘Decía que había hecho un nuevo presidente,’” El Periodista. [Online]. Available: https://www.elperiodista.cl/2026/08/expareja-de-cerimedo-confirma-vinculo-de-asesor-con-campana-de-kast-decia-que-habia-hecho-un-nuevo-presidente/

[118] Ruth Cárcamo, “Fiscalía abre investigación por eventuales delitos informáticos vinculados a Fernando Cerimedo en Chile,” ADN Radio. [Online]. Available: https://www.adnradio.cl/2026/09/03/fiscalia-abre-investigacion-por-eventuales-delitos-informaticos-vinculados-a-fernando-cerimedo-en-chile/

[119] Javiera Arriaza, “Esta vez estuvieron los votos: Cámara de Diputados aprueba comisión investigadora por caso Cerimedo,” La Tercera. [Online]. Available: https://www.latercera.com/politica/noticia/camara-de-diputados-aprueba-creacion-de-comision-investigadora-por-caso-cerimedo/

[120] Jairo Gómez, “Acusan a Cerimedo de fraguar fraude electoral en Colombia y Honduras,” La Jornada de Mexico. [Online]. Available: https://www.jornada.com.mx/2026/08/28/mundo/020n1mun

[121] Rixi Moncada [@riximga], “Exigimos una investigación a fondo sobre el caso de Fernando Cerimedo en Honduras: Lo que está saliendo a la luz en Bolivia sobre Fernando Cerimedo no puede ser desconocido en Honduras. Cerimedo, operador y asesor político extranjero vinculado a campañas de la derecha https://t.co/8JGvSLGsEB,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/hZBpz

[122] Gabriella Soares, “Flávio Bolsonaro ataca urnas eletrônicas em reunião com diplomatas,” G1. [Online]. Available: https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2026/07/21/em-reuniao-com-diplomatas-flavio-bolsonaro-ataca-urnas-eletronicas-com-acusacoes-ja-desmentidas-pelo-tse.ghtml

[123] Ana Luiza Albuquerque, “Eduardo Bolsonaro volta a descredibilizar sistema eleitoral após dado falso de Flávio sobre urnas,” Folha de S.Paulo. [Online]. Available: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2026/07/eduardo-bolsonaro-volta-a-descredibilizar-sistema-eleitoral-apos-dado-falso-de-flavio-sobre-urnas.shtml

[124] Paulo Motoryn et al., “ÁUDIO: Flávio Bolsonaro negociou com Daniel Vorcaro R$ 134 milhões para bancar filme sobre Jair,” Intercept Brasil. [Online]. Available: https://www.intercept.com.br/2026/05/13/audio-flavio-negociou-vorcaro-milhoes/

[125] Bruna Cabral and Ricardo Brito, “Brazil races to rein in AI weeks before election,” Reuters, Sep. 01, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-races-rein-ai-weeks-before-election-2026-09-01/

[126] AFP, AP, and Reuters, “Bolsonaro’s son begins Brazil presidential bid with Netanyahu, Milei kudos,” Al Jazeera. [Online]. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/26/bolsonaros-son-begins-brazil-presidential-bid-with-netanyahu-milei-kudos

[127] Bryan Harris, Michael Pooler, and Michael Stott, “The discreet US campaign to defend Brazil’s election,” Financial Times, Jun. 21, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://www.ft.com/content/07533564-2231-47a6-a7b8-2c7ae330efc5?syn-25a6b1a6=1

[128] Samantha Waldenberg, Betsy Klein, Ramishah Maruf, and John Towfighi, “Trump puts 50% tariffs on Brazil and copper while eliminating another tax loophole,” CNN. [Online]. Available: https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/30/politics/brazil-tariff-trump-executive-order

[129] Luciana Novaes Magalhaes and Andre Romani, “Brazil presidential hopeful Bolsonaro adds Rubio, Vance talks to Washington trail,” Reuters, May 27, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-presidential-hopeful-bolsonaro-adds-rubio-vance-talks-washington-trail-2026-05-27/

[130] Isabella Menon, “Flávio Bolsonaro Meets Trump and Says He Asked to Classify PCC and CV as Terrorist Groups,” Folha de S.Paulo. [Online]. Available: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/world/2026/05/flavio-bolsonaro-meets-trump-and-says-he-asked-to-classify-pcc-and-cv-as-terrorist-groups.shtml

[131] Mauricio Savarese, “U.S. government labels Brazil’s 2 biggest drug gangs as foreign terrorist organizations,” PBS News. [Online]. Available: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-government-labels-brazils-2-biggest-drug-gangs-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations

[132] Marina Dias, Terrence McCoy, and Samantha Schmidt, “Brazil denies visas to U.S. delegation aiming to impugn election system, officials say,” The Washington Post, Jul. 24, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/07/24/us-sending-envoys-question-brazilian-electoral-system-officials-say/

[133] GPAHE, “Samuel Samson: Meet the 27-Year-Old Courting the Far-Right While Abandoning Human Rights,” Global Project Against Hate and Extremism. [Online]. Available: https://globalextremism.org/post/samuel-samson/

[134] Ione Wells, “US revokes Brazil ambassador’s visa as diplomatic tensions escalate,” BBC. [Online]. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy9wpww7dyro

[135] Buenos Aires Times, “Lula says Trump ‘should not meddle’ in Brazil’s upcoming elections,” Buenos Aires Times. [Online]. Available: https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/lula-says-trump-should-not-meddle-in-brazils-upcoming-elections.phtml

[136] Redacción / SinEmbargo, “‘He Was Going to Get Involved in Mexico’s Elections,’ Nadia Beller Says of Fernando Cerimedo,” Mexico Solidarity Media. [Online]. Available: https://mexicosolidarity.com/cerimedo-mexico-elections/

[137] Jack Nicas and Emiliano Rodríguez Mega, “In Jab at Trump, Mexico Targets Foreign Election Meddling,” The New York Times, May 22, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/21/world/americas/mexico-election-interference-trump.html

[138] Patrick J McDonnell, “‘Coordination, not subordination’: Sheinbaum attacks U.S. ‘meddling’ in Mexico’s politics,” Los Angeles Times. [Online]. Available: https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2026-08-14/coordination-not-subordination-sheinbaum-attacks-u-s-meddling-in-mexicos-politics

[139] Mathieu Tourliere, “The ambiguities of Mexico’s Gen Z movement,” Le Monde, Nov. 24, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/11/22/the-ambiguities-of-the-generation-z-movement-in-mexico_6747717_4.html

[140] Karl Mathiesen, Marion Solletty, Tim Ross, Mari Eccles, and Nette Nöstlinger, “The MAGA-friendly European think tanks Trump wants to fund,” Politico. [Online]. Available: https://www.politico.eu/article/maga-friendly-european-think-tanks-donald-trump-funding/

[141] Humeyra Pamuk and Paul Carsten, “Trump administration plans $4 million for right-wing media in Europe, sources say,” Reuters, Aug. 31, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/trump-plans-4-million-right-wing-media-europe-sources-say-2026-08-31/

[142] Geoff Dembicki, “Revealed: The MAGA Plan to ‘Take Out’ Progressive Leaders Worldwide,” DeSmog. [Online]. Available: https://www.desmog.com/2026/04/09/revealed-the-maga-plan-to-take-out-progressive-leaders-worldwide/

[143] infobae, “Fernando Cerimedo declaró ante la Justicia de Bolivia y dijo que gana cerca de un millón de dólares por mes,” infobae. [Online]. Available: https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2026/08/29/fernando-cerimedo-declaro-ante-la-justicia-de-bolivia-y-dijo-que-gana-cerca-de-un-millon-de-dolares-por-mes/

[144] Maggie Severns, Josh Dawsey, and Natalie Andrews, “Israel’s $50 Million Experiment to Change U.S. Public Opinion,” Wall Street Journal, Jul. 19, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://www.wsj.com/politics/israels-50-million-experiment-to-change-u-s-public-opinion-253b3b70

[145] Fernando Cerimedo (@FerCerimedo_ok), “Fernando Cerimedo Twitter Account,” Twitter. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/osKnH

[146] Editorial Team, “Fernando Cerimedo will represent key firms in Trump’s campaign in Latin America,” La Derecha Diario en Inglés. [Online]. Available: https://archive.ph/LGimR

[147] Breaking Ice, Building Bridges by Possibilities, 40 - Chris Wilson has his Eyes Over American Politics, (Aug. 24, 2025). [Online Video]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CVSDOCdLuxw